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Joint Infringement and the Impact of BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.
Ben Morgan*
This comment addresses so-called "joint-infringement" claims. Gener-
ally speaking, a patent holder might bring a joint-infringement suit if he feels
that his patent has been infringed upon by the collective action of multiple
parties, rather than by a single actor. Section I of this comment provides an
overview of joint infringement and outlines the various tests courts have used
to handle these claims. Section II focuses on the joint-infringement test re-
cently promulgated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC"), which sharply limits the potential for joint-infringement
liability., Section III argues that the CAFC's new joint-infringement stan-
dard is not adequately supported by legal precedent, creates uncertainty, and
does not promote the goals and policies of the Patent Act of 1952. Finally,
Section IV provides advice for patentees and suggests ways that either the
CAFC or Congress could resolve some of the persistent, troublesome issues
presented by joint infringement claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Direct Infringement vs. Indirect Infringement
Patent-infringement liability comes in two basic forms: direct infringe-
ment and indirect infringement.2 Direct-infringement liability attaches to
"[w]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention."3 In most cases, to be liable for direct infringement, the alleged
infringer must "perform or use each and every step or element of a claimed
method or product."4 Direct infringement is a strict liability offense.5 That
is, a defendant who has performed each and every element of the patented
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1. Compare BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (requiring the defendant to have "control or direction" over the mul-
tiple parties involved), with On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc.,
442. F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding no flaw in a jury instruction that
stated, "When infringement results from the participation and combined ac-
tion(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly
liable for patent infringement").
2. See, e.g., Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d t263, 1272
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
3. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
4. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378.
5. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
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invention will be liable for direct infringement regardless of the defendant's
intent.6
Indirect-infringement liability may arise in two different ways: induced
infringement or contributory infringement.7 For both types of indirect in-
fringement, the plaintiff must first prove that someone else directly infringed
the patent. 8 As the CAFC has stated, "[l]iability for either active inducement
of infringement or for contributory infringement is dependent upon the exis-
tence of direct infringement."9 Unlike direct infringement, both forms of in-
direct infringement have mens rea requirements.o
Congress has codified liability for inducing infringement at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b), which provides, "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a pat-
ent shall be liable as an infringer."" The CAFC has now interpreted this
section to require "specific intent" to induce infringement.12 In essence,
§ 27 1(b) creates liability for those who-with the required mens rea-aid, abet,
or encourage another to infringe.13
Contributory infringement, on the other hand, is codified in § 271(c) of
the Patent Act:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manu-
facture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or espe-
cially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.'4
Congress enacted the contributory infringement rules to punish a manufac-
turer who sells a product to a customer knowing that the customer will use
6. Id.
7. See Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1272.
8. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 876
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
9. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
10. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
11. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) (2003).
12. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
13. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding
that one induces infringement "by actively and knowingly aiding and abetting
another's direct infringement") (emphasis in original).
14. Patent Act of 1952 § 27 1(c).
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that product, because of its specialized nature, to infringe a patented
process. 15
B. Joint Infringement
Joint infringement occurs when multiple parties collectively perform
each and every element of the patented invention, but no party does so indi-
vidually.16 Joint infringement has no statutory basis; it is a judicially-created
doctrine.'7 A claim of joint infringement allows a patentee, in certain cir-
cumstances, to aggregate the actions of multiple parties. This may allow a
patentee to bring a direct-infringement suit against a defendant who has not
technically performed each and every element of the patent claim, as direct
infringement traditionally requires.18
The rationale behind joint infringement is sound: a bright-line rule re-
quiring that an alleged infringer individually perform each and every element
of a patent claim could be too easily averted, thus reducing the protection
patent holders need. Under such a rule, an individual could avoid direct-
infringement liability by simply compelling a third party to perform one or
more elements of the patent claim.19
A simple example illustrates the point. Assume a patented process has
four steps. X performs steps one and two of the process, and then pays Y to
15. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932
(2005) ("The doctrine [of contributory infringement] was devised to identify
instances in which it may be presumed from distribution of an article in com-
merce that the distributor intended the article to be used to infringe another's
patent, and so may justly be held liable for that infringement. 'One who makes
and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination
will be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be
presumed to intend that they shall be used in the combination of the patent' ")
(quoting New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir.
1915)).
16. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379.
17. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680,
735 (D. Del. 1995) ("DuPont alleges that Monsanto is liable under § 271(a) on
a theory of joint infringement or joint manufacture. Although DuPont's theory
of joint infringement is interesting, the Court declines to find that Monsanto is
liable as a direct infringer under § 271(a) in connection with its conduct in
practicing step (a) of the claimed...").
18. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378 ("As the parties agree, Paymentech does not perform
every step of the method at issue in this case. With other parties performing
some claimed method steps, this court must determine if Paymentech may
nonetheless be liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)").
19. AdvanceMe, Inc. v. RapidPay, LLC, 509 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Tex.
2007) ("Liability for direct infringement cannot be avoided by interposing an
agent or independent contractor between the defendant and the infringing
acts").
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perform steps three and four. Under a bright-line rule mandating that a sin-
gle defendant performs every element of the patent process, neither X nor Y
is liable for direct infringement. Furthermore, neither party would be subject
to indirect-infringement liability, which requires a preliminary showing of
direct infringement.2o The joint-infringement doctrine seeks to close this
loophole and prevent the circumvention of infringement liability.
C. Various Joint-Infringement Tests
Courts have not reached a consensus over how to address joint-infringe-
ment claims. Generally, courts look first to whether each and every element
of the patent claim has been performed, albeit by multiple parties.21 Next,
courts focus on the relationship between the multiple parties who collectively
performed each element of the patent infringement.22 The stronger the rela-
tionship between those parties, the more likely the court will find joint-in-
fringement liability.
In analyzing the relationship between the alleged joint infringers, courts
have found the following factors to be significant: (1) whether the alleged
infringers were in an agency relationship;23 (2) whether the infringement re-
sulted from the "participation and combined action" of the alleged infring-
ers;24 (3) whether one alleged infringer contracted out steps of a patented
process to another;25 (4) whether there was a "connection" between the al-
leged infringers of sufficient strength to justify treating them as one party for
infringement purposes;26 and (5) whether one of the alleged infringers "di-
rected" the other(s). 27
20. See Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872,
876 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Absent direct infringement of the claims of a patent,
there can be neither contributory infringement nor inducement of
infringement").
21. See, e.g., AdvanceMe, 509 F. Supp. 2d 605 ("Even if a defendant does not
perform all patented method steps, the defendant is still liable for direct in-
fringement where it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) the steps of the patented method are being performed, and (2) defendant has
sufficient connection to, or control over, the entity or entities performing part
of the patented method") (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1944).
24. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff'd,
667 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680, 735 (D.
Del. 1995).
26. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 WL 111788,
at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999).
27. Charles E. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. Civ. A. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 WL
151911, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006).
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Many of the aforementioned factors are neither terribly descriptive nor
particularly helpful in providing guidance for courts analyzing joint infringe-
ment claims. One would be hard-pressed to say, for example, whether a
relationship is based on "direction," "some connection," "participation and
combined action," or a combination of these three factors. Nonetheless, the
issue that courts struggle with is clear: how broad or narrow should the scope
of liability be in joint-infringement cases? For instance, a standard that re-
quires one of the alleged infringers to "direct" the other parties recognizes
only a narrow sphere of joint-infringement liability. On the other hand, if a
patentee need only show "some connection" or "combined participation and
action" between the alleged infringers, the patentee is more likely to succeed
on a theory of joint infringement.
1. Agency and Joint Infringement
At least one area of joint-infringement law is well-settled: an alleged
infringer cannot avoid liability simply because an agent performed one or
more steps of the patented process. 28 If a principal and his agent collectively
practice each and every element of a patent infringement, the principal will
be liable for direct infringement.29 The most frequently cited case for this
proposition is Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit
said it was "obvious" that infringement can still exist if a party uses an agent
or independent contractor to execute his or her infringement.30 Because a
principal and his agent act as a single legal entity, however, Crowell does not
address the effect of a "true" joint-infringement claim "where there is no
agency relationship or similar coordination-for example where the different
actors do not know each other at all or are in an arm's-length business
transaction."31
2. The "Participation and Combined Action" Joint-Infringement
Standard
In Shields v. Halliburton Co.,32 the patent at issue was a twelve-step,
high-pressure grouting process for use in constructing off-shore oil plat-
28. See AdvanceMe, Inc. v. RapidPay, LLC, 509 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Tex.
2007) ("Liability for direct infringement cannot be avoided by interposing an
agent or independent contractor between the defendant and the infringing
acts"). See also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc. 586 F. Supp. 1176,
1226 (D. Kan. 1984) ("It is well settled that a party cannot avoid liability by
merely having a third party practice one or more of the required steps").
29. AdvanceMe, 509 F. Supp at 605.
30. Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1944).
31. Mark A. Lemley et. al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260
(2005).
32. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d
1232 (5th Cir. 1982).
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forms. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, Halliburton and Brown &
Root, Inc., infringed its patent on four different occasions. On no single oc-
casion, however, did either of the defendants individually perform all twelve
steps described in the patent claim. For instance, the evidence showed that
on one job, Brown & Root controlled the air pressure while Halliburton si-
multaneously pumped grout. Nonetheless, the court held, "[w]hen infringe-
ment results from the participation and combined action of several parties,
they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent infringement."33
3. Contracting Out Steps of a Patented Process and Joint
Infringement
In E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., the plaintiff brought
a direct-infringement suit against two defendants, Monsanto and CaMac Cor-
poration.34 DuPont alleged that the two defendants had jointly infringed the
plaintiffs patented process of creating nylon commercial carpet fibers. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware found, "Monsanto actually
practices step (a) of the claimed process and sells the resulting copolymer to
CaMac, who then practices steps (b) and (c)."35 In holding CaMac liable as a
direct infringer, the court explained that " [a] party cannot avoid liability for
having someone else perform one or more steps of a patented process for
them [... ] CaMac cannot avoid liability for infringement of DuPont's pro-
cess patent by paying Monsanto to practice step (a) of the patented process
for it."36 Monsanto, on the other hand, escaped direct-infringement liability.
The court seemed to believe that CaMac had "contracted out" steps of the
patented process to Monsanto, but not vice versa. 37 The court wrote that it
seemed "that this principle is more appropriately applied to CaMac than to
Monsanto."38
4. The "Some-Connection" Joint-Infringement Standard
Other courts have required that "some connection" exist between the
multiple parties who collectively perform each and every element of the pat-
ent claim in order to bring a joint-infringement suit. The origin of the "some
connection" variant of joint infringement is Faroudja Laboratories, Inc. v.
33. Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
34. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del.
1995).
35. Id. at 734.





Dwin Electronics, Inc.39 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, attempting to synthesize the seemingly inconsistent joint-infringe-
ment case law, wrote that "[i]t is true that several district courts have found a
party liable for direct infringement of a process patent even where the vari-
ous steps included in the patent are performed by distinct entities. However,
these cases indicate that some connection between the different entities justi-
fied that finding."4a
In Faroudja, the court ultimately concluded that the requisite "connec-
tion" did not exist between the alleged joint infringers.4 Nonetheless, the
court's "some connection" language connotes a broader and more malleable
scope of liability in joint infringement cases.
The "some-connection" test was next applied in Cordis Corp. v. Med-
tronic AVE, Inc.4 2 The District Court for the District of Delaware wrote that
direct infringement requires that "[e]ither a single entity must perform every
step of the method or, if two or more entities perform different steps of the
method, those entities must have some connection to each other."43
In Cordis, the plaintiff alleged infringement of a patented process of
selling, inserting, and expanding coronary stents. One of the defendants,
Boston Scientific Corporation ("BSC"), admittedly performed one part of the
patented process by selling its stent, which was pre-mounted on a balloon
catheter. BSC argued, however, that it had not directly infringed plaintiff's
patent because physicians performed the other steps of the patented process,
namely inserting and expanding the stent. 44 The court rejected BSC's argu-
39. See Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999 WL
111788 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) (claiming that the "some connection" doc-
trine was already implied in earlier cases).
40. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at *6. Faroudja is somewhat confusing because the joint infringement issue
came up in the context of plaintiff's indirect-infringement claim. The plaintiff
had patented a method of converting film to television, and then doubling the
number of lines used to create the image, thereby increasing image quality.
The defendant sold several types of "line-doublers," but "the parties agree[d]
that none of defendant's line-doublers perform any film-to-television conver-
sion, and that none of [defendant's] line-doublers contain any structure de-
signed for or capable of perform film-to-television conversion." Id. at *2.
Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that defendant had induced the third-party
users of its line-doublers to directly infringe the patent. Id. at *5. The "con-
nection" that plaintiff alleged, therefore, was actually between the third-party
users of defendant's line-doublers and the film-to-television transfer compa-
nies." Id. at *6. It was this "connection" that the court found too tenuous to
accept. Id.
42. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d. 323, 349 (D. Del. 2002)
(emphasis added).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
2009]
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ment, holding that there was evidence sufficient to support a finding of
"some connection" between BSC and the physicians.45 This evidence in-
cluded: (1) the "very close relationship" between BSC and the physicians, in
which BSC taught the physicians about BSC's products, how to use them,
and their relative advantages; (2) BSC's practice of sending sample stents to
the physicians; and (3) BSC's solicitation of feedback from physicians about
BSC's stent.46
5. The "Direction" Joint-Infringement Standard
Some courts have found that only a defendant who "actually directs" the
parties who collectively practice every element of a patent claim can be lia-
ble for direct infringement.47 In Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas purportedly applied the "some
connection" test.48 The court, however, required that the "defendant and the
third party are connected at least to the extent that the defendant must actu-
ally direct the third party to perform the remaining steps of the [patented]
method." 49 Despite ostensibly adopting a "some-connection" standard, the
court actually demanded that the defendant exert a greater amount of control
than contemplated in Faroudja and Cordis.
D. Disparity in Courts' Treatment of Similar Joint-Infringement
Claims
Courts have clearly struggled to develop a framework that allows for a
principled analysis of joint-infringement claims. While some courts closely
adhere to the traditional rule that a defendant must perform each and every
element of the patent claim, others are more lenient and allow the patentee to
aggregate the conduct of multiple parties who collectively practice every ele-
ment of the patent claim. Because of this disparity, it is difficult to predict
the outcome of joint-infringement suits, even under factually similar condi-
tions. The following two cases illustrate the point.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., the defendant allegedly in-
fringed patents related to the production and use of catalysts to break down
petroleum into smaller molecules, a process which rendered more marketable
gasoline.50 The plaintiff's patent described both the production of the cata-
lysts themselves and heating the catalysts in "catalytic cracking units." The
defendant manufactured the catalysts, and thereby performed the first step of
45. Id. at 350.
46. Id.
47. Charles E. Hill v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. Civ. A. 2:02-CV-186, 2006 WL
151911, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006).
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1973).
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the patented claim.51 The defendant then sold the catalysts to its customers
who, by heating the catalysts, performed the remaining steps of the patented
process. 52 Although the defendant had not performed each and every ele-
ment of the patent claim individually, the court found it liable for infringe-
ment. 53 The court reasoned, "[D]efendant, in effect, made each of its
customers its agent in completing the infringing step, knowing full well that
the infringement step would in fact be promptly and fully completed by those
customers."54
In Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., the patent at issue was a pro-
cess for making photographic printing plates used in lithography.55 Gener-
ally speaking, the process involved treating aluminum sheets with various
chemicals and then applying a light-sensitive coating. The defendant per-
formed the first part of the patented process and then sold the aluminum
sheets to its customers, who applied the light-sensitive coating to the sheets
and used them in lithography, as contemplated by the patent.
Although the manufacturer and its customers collectively performed
each element of the patent claim, the CAFC summarily dismissed the notion
that the manufacturer could be held liable for direct infringement.56 The
CAFC wrote, "Because the [patent] claims include the application of a
[chemical] coating or other light sensitive layer and because [defendant's]
customers, not [defendant], applied the [light-sensitive] coating, [defendant]
cannot be liable for direct infringement."57
In both W.R. Grace and Fromson, a manufacturer performed the prelim-
inary steps of a patented process and sold the resulting product to its custom-
ers. Considering the unique nature of the products sold in both cases, the
manufacturer gave implicit, if not express, instructions to its customers con-
cerning the use of its products. The customers then proceeded to perform the
final steps of the patented process. In each case, therefore, the manufacturer
and its customer collectively performed each and every element of the pat-
ented process, although neither party performed all of the elements itself.
Despite these marked similarities, the courts came to entirely different con-
clusions. In W.R. Grace, the court refused to allow the defendant to escape
infringement liability by enlisting its customers to perform the final steps of
the patent claim.58 Conversely, in Fromson, the CAFC seemed reluctant to




55. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 1568.
57. Id.
58. W.R. Grace, 367 F. Supp. at 253.
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entertain the possibility of direct-infringement liability absent a showing that
the defendant had performed each and every element of the patent claim.59
E. Summary
Several points derive from the discussion above. First, most courts
seem wary of promulgating a bright-line rule that each and every element of
a process patent claim must be performed by a single entity.60 One can easily
see how a formalistic rule like the one in Fromson would fail to adequately
protect the rights of patent holders. Potential infringers could escape in-
fringement liability simply by outsourcing one or more steps of a patented
process to a third party.
Second, the preceding cases illustrate the tension inherent in joint-
infringement jurisprudence. On one hand, courts want to protect the inven-
tions of patent holders; a defendant should not be able to infringe a patent
with impunity by merely interposing a third party.6' On the other hand, an
overly relaxed joint-infringement standard could create uncertainty and un-
reasonably expand the scope of infringement liability.
Third, courts appear unable to develop clear and consistent joint-in-
fringement jurisprudence.62 Courts have repeatedly attempted to describe the
character of the relationship between alleged infringers necessary for joint-
infringement liability. They ask whether there is "some connection" or "par-
ticipation and combined action" between the various parties. Courts have
been unable, however, to consistently apply these vague tests. This has en-
gendered much uncertainty in this area of law.
59. See Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1568.
60. Compare Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., No. 97-20010 SW, 1999
WL 111788, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999) (stating that some courts find
liability where there is a connection between the two infringing parties), and
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d. 323, 349 (D. Del. 2002)
(holding that direct infringement by two entities requires some connection be-
tween the two), with Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (denying a
direct infringement claim where the manufacturer did not perform all the steps
of a patented claim).
61. AdvanceMe Inc. v. RapidPay, LLC, 509 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
("Liability for direct infringement cannot be avoided by interposing an agent or
independent contractor between the defendant and the infringing acts.").
62. Compare W.R. Grace, 367 F. Supp. at 253 (holding a manufacturer liable for
direct infringement even though its customers completed the infringement
step), with Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1568 (holding that a manufacturer cannot be





In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, LP, the CAFC announced a
new standard in joint-infringement cases: a "mastermind" defendant may be
liable for direct infringement so long as he "controls or directs" each step of
the patented process. 6 3 In other words, a "mastermind" defendant may be
liable for direct infringement despite not having performed each and every
element of the patented process itself.64
A. On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc. 65
The CAFC's decision in BMC was much anticipated.66 This is because
in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc., a 2006 case, the
CAFC appeared to endorse an expansive scope of liability in joint-infringe-
ment claims.67 The patent at issue in On Demand was for a "system and
method of manufacturing a single book copy."68 The patent contemplated
special computers being installed in retail book stores for customer use. The
computer would contain the entire text of many books, along with book re-
views and other promotional material. After browsing this material, a cus-
tomer could purchase a book, and a machine would print and bind a copy
while the customer waited.
The defendants in the suit were Ingram Industries, Lightning Source,
and Amazon.com, Inc. Ingram Industries was the corporate parent of Light-
ning Source, a book printing company who sold to publishers, wholesalers
and retailers, such as Amazon.com. Although Lightning Source never sold
directly to the public, as contemplated in On Demand's patent, it would occa-
sionally print a single copy of a book upon demand from a client, such as
Amazon.com.
At trial, the jury found that the defendants had infringed On Demand's
patent and awarded $15,000,000 in compensatory damages.69 The defend-
ants appealed, challenging, among other things, the accuracy of certain jury
instructions.70
63. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
64. See id.
65. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc. 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
66. See Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O Patent Law Blog, http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/03/divided-infring.html (March 15, 2007)
("The next big kahuna is BMC v. Paymentech," because it "squarely presents
the concept of divided infringement.").
67. See On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1345.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1336.
70. Id. at 1337.
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The CAFC ultimately reversed, holding that no reasonable jury could
have found infringement based upon the application of the correct claim con-
struction.71 However, the CAFC noted that it found no flaw with the follow-
ing jury instruction:
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be
performed by one person or entity. When infringement results
from the participation and combined action(s) of more than one
person or entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for
patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process cannot be
avoided by having another perform one step of the process or
method.72
The language of this jury instruction came directly from Shields v. Hallibur-
ton, in which defendants Halliburton and Brown & Root were both held lia-
ble for direct infringement based upon their collective infringement of a
high-pressure grouting process patent. 73 In Shields, the plaintiff presented no
evidence that Halliburton controlled Brown & Root, or vice versa. Rather, it
appeared that Halliburton and Brown & Root were merely working together
on a grouting project and, in doing so, collectively performed each element
of the patented process. 74
In On Demand, therefore, the CAFC appeared to give its blessing to a
pliable test that potentially expanded the scope of liability in joint-infringe-
ment cases. 75 Yet, the CAFC offered no analysis in approving the jury in-
struction, and its approval was arguably dicta in the first place.76 Thus, BMC
71. Id. at 1345 ("The fundamental precept of the [On Demand] invention is that the
customer uses an on-site compute to view promotional information, and then
initiates rapid single copy printing. A customer placing an order with Amazon,
who in turn obtains the book, even if it is printed in single copy, is not the [On
Demand] invention ... The printing of a single copy of a book, using computer
technology and high-speed printing, was prior art to the [On Demand] patent.
The defendants correctly point out that the [On Demand] invention is the imme-
diate printing and binding of a copy of a book.") (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1344-45.
73. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), affd,
667 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1982) ("When infringement results from the participa-
tion and combined action of several parties, they are all joint infringers and
jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process or
method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of the process or
method") (internal citation omitted).
74. See id. at 1387.
75. See On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1345. Reading On Demand literally, it appears
that a defendant who merely participates to some degree in the infringement of
a patent can be held jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's damages. Id.
76. Id. Beyond quoting the jury instruction and stating, "We discern no flaw in this
instruction as a statement of law," the CAFC did not discuss the issue of joint
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was perceived to be the case in which the CAFC would resolve the uncer-
tainty created by On Demand with respect to the proper analysis of joint
infringement claims.
B. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.
1. Factual Background
BMC Resources, Inc. ("BMC") patented a method for paying bills by
debit card over the telephone without the use of personal identification num-
ber. The customer (payer) calls the merchant (payee) and provides payment
information through an interactive voice response unit. The information is
then transmitted to the debit network and card-issuing financial institution to
approve and complete the transaction. The patent, therefore, necessarily im-
plicated the actions of multiple parties in each transaction, namely the payer,
the payee's third-party agent (e.g. BMC), the debit network, and the financial
institution.
Paymentech, L.P. ("Paymentech") is a third-party processor of financial
transactions that developed a telephonic bill-payment system nearly identical
to that of BMC. In Paymentech's system, a bill-paying customer calls the
merchant and provides payment information, which is sent to Paymentech.
Paymentech in turn routes the information to the debit network and financial
institution for authorization.
Upon learning of Paymentech's bill-payment system, BMC demanded
that Paymentech enter into a licensing agreement to use its patented method.
Paymentech refused and filed suit in federal district court, seeking a declara-
tory judgment that it had not infringed BMC's patent.7 7 BMC counter-
claimed, alleging that Paymentech had directly infringed BMC's patent.78
Both parties agreed that Paymentech did not perform each and every element
of the patent claim itself.79 Relying on On Demand, BMC argued that the
"participation and combined action" between Paymentech, the debit net-
works, and financial institutions constituted a sufficient "connection" to hold
Paymentech liable for direct infringement.80
infringement. Id. The CAFC ultimately reversed the judgment of infringement
on the claim construction issue. Id.
77. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3:03-CV-1927-M, 2006 WL 1450480
at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
78. Id. Although Paymentech filed its suit for declaratory judgment first, the par-
ties realigned after BMC's counterclaim, with BMC as plaintiff and Pay-
mentech as defendant. Id.
79. See id. at *4.
80. Id. at *3.
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2. CAFC Adopts "Control-or-Direction" Joint-Infringement
Standard
The CAFC began its analysis by stating the traditional rule that
"[i]nfringement requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has
practiced each and every element of the claimed invention."s' Nonetheless,
the CAFC did carve out a narrow exception to this general rule.82 In a case
brought on a joint-infringement theory, a "mastermind" defendant may be
held liable for direct infringement if he controls or directs the performance of
each step of the patented process, even if he does not practice each element
himself.83
BMC argued that "On Demand adopted a 'participation-and-combined-
action' standard as the type of 'connection' a plaintiff must show to prove
joint infringement."84 According to BMC, this flexible standard embraced
the type of "participation and combined action" found between Paymentech,
its customers, and the financial institutions.85
The CAFC, however, flatly rejected BMC's argument and dismissed as
dicta the CAFC's approval of the jury instruction in On Demand.86 The court
stated, "On Demand did not change this court's precedent with regard to joint
infringement."87 The CAFC went on to explain that "[a]s Paymentech suc-
cinctly noted in its brief, '[i]t is unlikely the Court intended to make a major
change in its jurisprudence in the On Demand [statement] that was not even
directly necessary to its decision in the case.'"88 By rejecting the "participa-
tion-and-combined-action" standard of On Demand in favor of "control or
direction," the CAFC clearly intended to sharply limit the scope of joint-
infringement liability.89
3. CAFC's Rationale for "Control-or-Direction" Standard
In BMC, the CAFC offered three main arguments in support of a "con-
trol-or-direction" standard in joint-infringement cases. First, the court argued
that a looser joint-infringement standard would subvert the statutory scheme
of § 271 of the Patent Act by rendering its indirect-infringement provisions
81. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
82. See id. at 1380-81.
83. Id.





89. See id. at 1378 (calling the "some connection" test advocated by BMC a
"looser standard of joint infringement" and a "relaxed rule").
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unnecessary. 90 The CAFC's second argument was essentially pragmatic: the
need to bring a joint-infringement suit could be avoided by the patentee's
proper claim drafting.9' Finally, the court made a policy judgment that a less
restrictive standard for joint infringement suits would unjustifiably expand
the scope of potential infringement liability.92
The CAFC wrote in BMC that holding Paymentech liable for direct in-
fringement would "subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement."93
As discussed above, both forms of indirect-infringement liability require
proof of direct infringement and have mens rea requirements.94 The CAFC
wrote, "Under BMC's proposed approach, a patentee would rarely, if ever,
need to bring a claim for indirect infringement."95
Although the CAFC makes this statutory construction argument in rela-
tively perfunctory terms, Professor Mark Lemley explains the idea in more
detail in an article titled Divided Infringement Claims, which was cited in
BMC:
Construing the patent laws to permit the individual, non-infringing
acts of unrelated parties together to add up to infringement would
render both § 271(b) and § 271(c) meaningless. Section 271(b)
provides that a party is liable if it knowingly induces another to
infringe. But on a theory of joint infringement, no one need ever
sue for inducement. All they need allege is that a party performed
one of many steps of a method, and that someone else performed
another step. No intent would be required. The result would be to
unreasonably expand liability for indirect infringement by conflat-
ing it with direct infringement.96
In essence, the CAFC argues that a "participation-and-combined-action"
standard nullifies the indirect-infringement provisions of the Patent Act,
along with their mens rea requirements, because a plaintiff would simply
aggregate the conduct of the multiple parties in a joint-infringement suit,
which is a strict-liability offense. 97 Because the CAFC believed that Con-
gress could not have intended such a result, it adopted a "control-of-direc-
tion" test instead.






96. Lemley, supra note 31, at 262.
97. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
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In support of its holding, the CAFC also argued that proper claim draft-
ing would obviate the patentee's need to bring a joint infringement claim in
the first place.98 The CAFC wrote:
The concerns over a party avoiding infringement by arms-length
cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim drafting. A pat-
entee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a
single party. In this case, for example, BMC could have drafted
its claim to focus on one entity. The steps of the claim might have
featured references to a single party's supplying or receiving each
element of the claimed process. However, BMC chose instead to
have four different parties perform different acts within one
claim.99
Again, the CAFC cited Professor Lemley's article, which explains the
utility of drafting "unitary" rather than "distributed" claims. 00 As an exam-
ple, Lemley drafts the same method of claim for negotiating a secure com-
munications session twice: once as a "unitary" claim and then as a
"distributed" claim.1oI In the "unitary" claim, every step of the method claim
focuses on the server's involvement in that step, rather than on the other
parties implicated in the transaction.102 For instance, the first step of Lem-
ley's poorly-drafted "distributed" claim is the remote client "transmitting a
request to a server."103 Conversely, the first step of Lemley's properly-
drafted "unitary" claim is the server "receiving a request from a client."104 A
simple grammatical change shifts focus away from the remote client's trans-
mission of information to the server's receipt of that information.
The rest of Lemley's unitary claim is drafted in the same manner; it
concentrates on the server's actions in each step.10 5 Since the server is the
only actor in the claim, the patentee has no need to rely on a joint-infringe-
ment theory if he feels his patent has been infringed. Rather, the patentee
could simply bring a direct-infringement suit against the allegedly infringing
server. Furthermore, if the patentee feels that another party, such as the re-
mote client in Lemley's example, had contributed to, or induced, the direct
infringement, the patentee could bring suit against that party under § 271(b)
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1381 (internal citations omitted).
100. See Lemley, supra note 31, at 272-73.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 272-73 ("Most inventions that involve cooperation of multiple entities
can be covered using claims drafted in unitary form simply by focusing on one
entity and whether it supplies or receives any given element").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 273.
105. Id. at 272-73.
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or (c) of the Patent Act. Conscientious claim drafting, therefore, allows the
holder of a patent involving multiple parties to effectively enforce the claim
without resorting to the more novel and unpredictable theory of joint
infringement.
Finally, part of the CAFC's rationale for its "control-or-direction" stan-
dard appears to be a policy judgment that an independent party ought not be
held liable for infringement by virtue of having unknowingly performed one
step in a patented process, even if that leaves a patentee without a remedy.
The court said it "acknowledges that the standard requiring control or direc-
tion for a finding of joint infringement may in some circumstances allow
parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement. Nonethe-
less, this concern does not outweigh concerns over expanding the rules gov-
erning direct infringement."106
By specifically acknowledging that those in "arms-length agreements"
will sometimes escape infringement liability, the CAFC sends a message to
business entities that they should not be apprehensive about the prospect of
jointly infringing a patent with a business partner. Although the CAFC does
not expressly make the argument, one can see how fear and anxiety about
infringement liability could make businesses less likely to cooperate, which
would have negative economic implications. A "control-or-direction" stan-
dard, therefore, might enhance economic productivity by allowing businesses
to contract freely, without fear of infringement liability.
C. Summary of Current Law
In On Demand, the CAFC appeared to embrace a flexible joint-infringe-
ment standard that was quite favorable to patentees.107 In BMC, however, the
CAFC did an about-face and dismissed as dicta the On Demand joint-in-
fringement language. 08 Going forward, a patentee must prove that a single
defendant controlled or directed the performance of every step of the pat-
ented process in order to prevail on a joint-infringement claim.109 This
change makes it more difficult for a patentee to bring suit on a joint-infringe-
ment theory.
106. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
107. See On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
108. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
109. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS OF BMC, SUGGESTIONS FOR PATENTEES, AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY
JOINT INFRINGEMENT
A. Critique of the CAFC's "Control-or-Direction" Standard
The CAFC's recently adopted "control-or-direction" standard has sev-
eral problems. First, the CAFC's holding is not adequately supported by
legal precedent. Second, although the CAFC attempted to resolve the uncer-
tainties surrounding the scope of joint-infringement liability, the CAFC
failed to provide guidance as to what constitutes "control or direction."
Third, a less restrictive joint-infringement standard would not render the indi-
rect-infringement provisions of the Patent Act meaningless, as suggested by
the CAFC. Fourth, not all patents can be drafted in a "unitary" manner, and
these patentees are left unprotected from infringers under the "control or di-
rection" standard. Finally, the CAFC's "control-or-direction" standard does
not further the policies that Congress sought to promote through the Patent
Act.
1. The "Control-or-Direction" Standard is Not Adequately
Supported by Legal Precedent
In BMC, the CAFC wrote, "Courts faced with a divided infringement
theory have also generally refused to find liability where one party did not
control or direct each step of the patented process."o10 In support of this
conclusion, the CAFC cited three cases: Faroudja Laboratories v. Dwin
Electronics, Inc, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., and the district court's
opinion in BMC itself."'
Faroudja, discussed above, lends little support to the narrow "control or
direction" standard adopted by the CAFC. The Faroudja court wrote that in
each successful joint-infringement suit "the entities found to directly infringe
patented processes worked in concert with other entities to complete the pro-
cess of infringement."12 If anything, Faroudja seems more closely aligned
with the On Demand "participation-and-combined-action" standard than the
BMC "control or direction" standard.
The second case the CAFC relied upon for its assertion that courts "gen-
erally" require "control or direction" was Filtrol."13 The CAFC cited to a
portion of the Filtrol opinion where the Ninth Circuit wrote, "We question
whether a method claim can be infringed when two separate entities perform
different operations and neither has control of the other's activities. No case
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Faroudja Labs., Inc. v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., 1999 WL 111788, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 24, 1999). A case cited for this proposition was Shields v. Halliburton
Co., the case from which the On Demand jury instruction was drawn.
113. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380.
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in point has been cited.",4 It should be noted, however, that Filtrol was
decided in 1974. Although the Ninth Circuit "questioned" whether joint in-
fringement could exist absent control in 1974, the Filtrol decision pre-dates
Shields, Monsanto, Cordis and other cases that allowed joint-infringement
claims to proceed without a showing of control.' 15 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit devoted only a single paragraph to joint infringement in its Filtrol
opinion.,16 All in all, Filtrol is hardly strong support for the expansive state-
ment that courts "generally" require control or direction.
Finally, the CAFC cited the district court's opinion in BMC.17 It seems
somewhat circular for the CAFC to cite the very decision it is affirming to
buttress the claim that courts "generally" require control or direction. In
sum, the CAFC's "control or direction" standard probably stems more from
policy concerns than from strong legal precedent.
2. "Control-or-Direction" Standard Creates, Rather Than
Resolves, Uncertainty Regarding Joint Infringement
Facially, the BMC "control-or-direction" standard appears more explan-
atory than the "some-connection" test; the language itself is stronger and less
ambiguous. However, the BMC test is not as lucid as it appears and falls
victim to the same pitfalls as previous tests.
First, BMC does not clarify whether a contract between parties consti-
tutes "control or direction." The BMC opinion states that "[a] party cannot
avoid infringement, however, simply by contracting out steps of a patented
process to another entity."18 Contracting out steps in such a manner would
constitute "control" and subject the contracting party to direct infringement
liability.1'9 This rationale seems sensible and is consistent with On
Demand. 120
However, the very next paragraph of the BMC opinion states, "This
court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or direction for a find-
ing of joint infringement may in some circumstances allow parties to enter
into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement."12, Taken together, these
two statements have once again muddied the waters. On one hand, a party
114. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974).
115. Shields, Monsanto, and Cordis were decided in 1980, 1995 and 2002,
respectively.
116. See Filtrol, 501 F.2d at 291-92.
117. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380.
118. Id. at 1381.
119. Id.
120. On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (noting that "Infringement of a patented process or method cannot be
avoided by having another perform one step of the process or method.").
121. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
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cannot contract out steps of a patented process to avoid liability. On the
other hand, sometimes a party can enter into arms-length agreements to avoid
liability. What is the difference between a contract and an arms-length
agreement? Can a party contract out steps of a patented process to avoid
infringement liability, so long as the contract is made at arms-length?
Whether a contractual relationship constitutes a sufficient relationship
between multiple parties to justify joint infringement liability has been an
issue that courts have repeatedly wrestled with in joint-infringement cases.
The internal inconsistency of the BMC opinion ensures that future courts will
continue to struggle with the effect of a contractual relationship, and whether
the agreement is "arms-length."
Second, it is still unclear after BMC whether instructions constitute
"control or direction." In applying the "control-or-direction" test to the facts
of BMC, the CAFC found inadequate "BMC's evidence that Paymentech
provides data (debit card number, name, amount of purchase, etc.) to the
debit networks, absent any evidence that Paymentech also provides instruc-
tions or directions regarding the use of those data."122 This statement sug-
gests that the provision of instructions may constitute "control."
The CAFC rejected, however, the idea that instruction, and hence con-
trol, could be inferred from the circumstances in BMC. The court noted,
"BMC argues that instructions or directions [to the debit networks] can be
inferred from the provision of these data, or that the data themselves provide
instructions or directions."23 The CAFC dismissed this argument, holding,
"[H]aving presented no evidence below to support either theory, BMC is not
entitled to such an inference with respect to the debit networks that would
allow it to survive summary judgment."124 What type of evidence would
have entitled BMC to the desired inference? If BMC had proven that, absent
any express instruction, it was industry practice for a debit network to act in a
particular manner upon receipt of certain information, would that have enti-
tled BMC to an inference that Paymentech had instructed the debit networks?
Would such inferred instructions constitute control?
Although the CAFC has changed the language to be used in joint in-
fringement cases by requiring "control or direction," courts will continue to
hash out the same old issues. Can a party avoid infringement liability by
contracting with a third party to perform one or more steps of a patented
process? Do instructions from one party to another warrant the aggregation
of the parties' actions for infringement purposes? Courts have perpetually
struggled with these questions in joint-infringement suits, and the answers




124. Id. at 1381-82.
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3. Indirect Infringement Would Not be Obsolete Under a
Broader Joint-Infringement Standard
Part of the CAFC's rationale for its decision in BMC was that to hold
otherwise would render indirect-infringement liability unnecessary.125 To
briefly recap, to establish indirect-infringement liability, a plaintiff must
prove: (1) that one party directly infringed the claim; and (2) that another
party, with mens rea, either contributed to or induced the infringement. 126
Under the looser "participation and combined action" standard approved in
On Demand, the CAFC concluded that "a patentee would rarely, if ever, need
to bring a claim for direct infringement."127
Contrary to this prediction, an indirect-infringement suit would not be
so rare under a standard looser than "control or direction." In its amicus
curiae brief in support of BMC, Freedom Wireless, Inc. provided examples
of common situations in which inducement to infringe and contributory in-
fringement would still be viable causes of action under a broader joint-in-
fringement standard. 128
With respect to inducing infringement, Freedom Wireless writes:
A claim for inducement of infringement would still be asserted
whenever, with mens rea, one person causes another to perform
one or more steps of a patented method, but the inducer himself
performs no steps. Under such a classic case of inducement, joint
infringement has not occurred because the inducer performs no
steps. 129
As suggested by Freedom Wireless, courts have commonly held a party lia-
ble for inducing infringement when that party cannot be liable as a direct
infringer because it has not performed any element of the patented claim.130
For instance, the defendant in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardi-
nal Industries, Inc. induced infringement through its advertisements and in-
structions to customers.13' The patent in Chiuminatta described a method of
cutting concrete before it hardened completely. Cardinal Industries, Inc.
125. Id. at 1381.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Brief for Freedom Wireless, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants,
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 2007 WL
4453981, at *8.
129. Id.
130. See generally, DONALD S. CHISUM, 5-17 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04 [4] (An-
drew Stein et al. eds., 2008) ("The Section 27 1(b) prohibition on active induce-
ment of infringement covers a wide variety of acts.").
131. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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("Cardinal") manufactured and sold rotary saws and did not personally per-
form any of the steps in the patented method claim. Nonetheless, the CAFC
held Cardinal liable because the instructions for cutting cement that accom-
panied the saw induced the user of the saw to infringe the plaintiff's
patent. 132
Chiuminatta is an example of a common suit that could only be brought
under § 271(b). The defendant in Chiuminatta did not perform any of the
steps in the process claim at issue, so the plaintiff could not have brought suit
on a joint-infringement theory. 33 Thus, contrary to the CAFC's assertion, a
joint infringement standard other than "control or direction" would not
render § 271(b) superfluous.
Moreover, the CAFC's argument with respect to contributory infringe-
ment is equally misguided. Whereas joint infringement allows a plaintiff to
aggregate the conduct of several parties, each of whom have performed at
least one step in the patented process, contributory infringement addresses a
situation where a supplier sells a unique product with knowledge that its
customer will use the product for infringing purposes. 34 A looser joint-
infringement standard, therefore, would not impact the usefulness of contrib-
utory-infringement liability, unless the acts of producing and selling the
product are elements of the patent claim. On this note, Freedom Wireless
argues:
[C]ontributory infringement would be pled whenever, with mens
rea, one person sells a component of a patented device which is
not a staple of commerce possessing substantial non-infringing
uses. Again, this common contributory infringement scenario has
nothing to do with two persons acting in concert or collaborating
to perform a patented method. 35
4. Patentees Whose Claims Cannot be Drafted in "Unitary"
Manner are Left Without Protection
To justify narrowing the scope of liability in joint-infringement cases,
the CAFC argued that a patentee with a carefully drafted "unitary" patent
claim would rarely need to bring a joint infringement suit.136 The CAFC is
132. Id.
133. epicRealm Licensing, LLC v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 608, 630
(E.D. Tex. 2007) ("There is no authority, however, for imposing liability for
direct infringement on a party that does not perform any of the steps of the
patented method") (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 627 ("There can be no liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) for direct in-
fringement of a method or process claim where the accused infringer does not
itself perform any of the steps set forth in one or more of the asserted claims").
135. Brief Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 130, at *8.
136. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
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undoubtedly correct that a patent claim, when possible, should be drafted in
this manner to facilitate its enforcement. Furthermore, most patent claims,
including the claim at issue in BMC, can be drafted in a unitary fashion.' 37
The CAFC implicitly acknowledged, however, that not all patent claims
can be drafted in this manner. It wrote, "The concerns over a party avoiding
infringement by arms-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper
claim drafting. A patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringe-
ment by a single party."3 8 To illustrate that not all patents can be drafted in
the manner suggested, BMC, in its petition for a rehearing en banc, wrote
that "[t]he Panel's suggestion that claims should be written with reference to
a single party's supplying or receiving each element of the claimed process
would be unworkable for a serial process involving acts by three or more
persons."139
Holders of such patents are left without protection under the new
"control-or-direction" standard. Moreover, as BMC points out, a patent is no
less valuable or worthy of protection just because it cannot be drafted in a
"unitary" manner:
The Panel's statement that "[a] patentee can usually structure a
claim to capture infringement by a single party" ignores a person's
constitutional right to obtain meaningful patent protection for his
invention and the patentee's obligation to clearly claim the inven-
tion. This right extends to an inventive process that requires mul-
tiple parties to carry out that process. That is, an invention
directed to a process that uses multiple parties is no less an inven-
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 101.140
5. BMC's "Control-or-Direction" Standard Does Not Promote
the Goals of the Patent Act
The purpose of the Patent Act is to promote the disclosure of new and
useful inventions.141 As an incentive to publicize inventions rather than with-
hold them, the Patent Act gives patentees an exclusive monopoly over their
inventions for a period of time.142 By providing legal protection for patented
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Plantiff-Appellant BMC Resources, Inc.'s Petition for Rehearing en banc at
*15, BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No.
06-1503).
140. Id. at *14-15.
141. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945)
("The primary purpose of our patent system is... the advancement of the arts
and sciences.").
142. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
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inventions, the Patent Act benefits society as a whole.143 If patentees are
unsure of this protection, however, the incentive to publicize their inventions
is diminished.
In BMC, the CAFC unabashedly recognized that multiple parties in
arms-length agreements could collectively perform each and every element
of a patent claim yet avoid infringement liability, so long as one party did not
control or direct the other. Concededly, the harshness of this rule can be
mitigated in many cases by proper claim drafting. Certain patents, however,
are not amenable to "unitary" claim drafting. Other patentees simply might
not have realized or anticipated the necessity of drafting a "unitary" claim. If
one seeks to exploit the value of such a patent, he need only divide the ele-
ments of the claim between himself and another party and avoid indicia of
"direction or control."
By reducing the legal protection available for patents involving multiple
parties, inventors are less likely to seek patent protection for socially-useful
discoveries, in contravention of the goals of the Patent Act.
B. What Should Patentees Do to Protect Their Intellectual Property
Rights?
1. Patentees Should Be Aware of Industries Most Likely
Affected by BMC
Despite its imperfections, patentees must adapt to the CAFC's "control-
or-direction" standard. It is valuable to consider the industries and types of
patents most likely affected by the "control-or-direction" standard. First,
business method patents commonly involve multiple parties, and therefore,
the holders of such patents may be adversely affected by BMC. 144 Many
business method patents are held by credit-card companies and financial-
services institutions.145 These patents often:
[I]nvolve interactions or communications between central loca-
tions (e.g., a Web site, a customer service representative, a call
routing location, etc.) and remote locations (e.g., a customer using
a PC to access the Web site, a customer using a phone to call the
customer service representative, etc.). As a result, sometimes pat-
ent claims will be drafted setting forth activities that are per-
formed by different actors in these systems. For example, a claim
143. See Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 331 ("[The Patent Act's] inducement is directed to
disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is
not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclose.").
144. Thomas J. Scott, Jr. & Stephen T. Schreiner, Planning for the Brave New
World: Are Business Method Patents Going to be Second Class Citizens?, 19
No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6, 10-11.
145. Id. at 8. (For example, American Express, MasterCard, Capital One, Wells




may recite a customer transmitting date to a server (actor is the
customer), the server processing the date to generate a result (ac-
tor is the company running the Web site), and so forth.146
Therefore, credit-card companies and financial-services institutions
should take special notice of BMC and make every effort to draft future
claims in a unity manner in order to protect their business method patents.
Second, computer-networking patent claims are likely to be impacted by
BMC. 147 Professor Lemley notes that "distributed or divided patent claims
are surprisingly common, particularly in the field of computer networking,
where a patented process may involve some steps performed on the client
side and others performed on the server side."148 For example, the patent at
issue in epicRealm Licensing, LLC v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc. pertained to a
method of generating web pages through the interaction of a web server, a
page server, and various other data sources. 49
Finally, several recent joint-infringement cases have involved patents
for medical products and methods in which the design or manufacturing
component of the claim was performed by one party, and doctors performed
the remaining elements of the claim.150
2. Draft Claims in "Unitary" Form
Patent applicants should follow the CAFC's advice and draft patent
claims in "unitary form" whenever possible.'15 As pointed out by the CAFC
and Professor Lemley, most patent claims can be drafted in this manner. 52
Considering the relative ease of drafting and enforcing "unitary" claims,
146. Id. at 10.
147. Lemley et al., supra note 31, at 256.
148. Id.
149. epicRealm Licensing, LLC, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
150. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d
1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concerning a method of securing surgical im-
plants to stabilize and align the bones of a patient's spine without damaging the
spinal cord); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d. 323, 328-
30 (D. Del. 2002) (concerning a method of implanting and inflating an expand-
able stent into diseased coronary arteries).
151. Lemley, supra note 31, at 272 ("First and foremost, it is important to recognize
the risk that divided or distributed patent claims may leave the patentee with no
remedy at all. Given such recognition, appropriate refinements to claiming
strategies are often straightforward.").
152. Id. ("Most inventions that involve cooperation of multiple entities can be cov-
ered using claims drafted in unitary form simply by focusing on one entity and
whether it suppliers or receives any given element."); see also BMC Res., Inc.,
498 F.3d at 1381 ("A patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringe-
ment by a single party.").
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every patentee should take care to focus on a single entity in each patent
claim. Doing so will save the patentee the cost and uncertainty of litigating a
joint infringement suit.153
C. Potential Solutions to the Problems Presented by
Joint-Infringement Claims
Two very different courses of action could be taken to address the diffi-
cult issues presented by joint-infringement claims: (1) the CAFC could clar-
ify the "control-or-direction" standard; or (2) Congress could pass legislation
addressing infringement suits involving multiple parties. Specifically, Con-
gress could adopt a comparative responsibility scheme for suits against mul-
tiple alleged infringers. Although this comment merely sketches out a
proposed framework in summary form, a comparative responsibility scheme
would address many of the unique issues presented by joint-infringement
claims that courts have been unable to adequately handle under current law.
1. Clarify the "Control-or-Direction" Standard
As discussed above, the vagueness and inconsistencies of the BMC
opinion create doubt as to what constitutes "control or direction." The most
contentious question emerging from BMC is whether a contractual relation-
ship between parties constitutes "control" for infringement liability purposes.
The CAFC's answer to this question was equivocal. On one hand, a contract
could serve as evidence that one party controlled the other. On the other
hand, parties in an arms-length agreement could avoid infringement liability.
At the very least, the CAFC must clarify in future cases how courts should
deal with contractual relationships in evaluating "control or direction."
2. Pass Legislation Adopting a Comparative Responsibility
Scheme
Section 271 of the Patent Act functions well when a single defendant
performs every element of a patented claim. This section is ill-suited, how-
ever, to address a situation in which multiple parties collectively perform
each and every element of a patent claim. Instead of perpetually struggling
to make the theory of joint infringement work within the confines of § 271,
Congress could adopt an entirely different scheme to address infringement
claims against multiple parties. Patent infringement is a claim based in tort,
and the trend in tort law has been to adopt schemes of comparative negli-
gence, comparative fault, or comparative responsibility. 54 Although adopt-
153. See Lemley, supra note 31, at 272-76 (giving more information on drafting
unitary claims).
154. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931)
("Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies
invasion of some right of the patentee."). See also In re Masters Mates &
Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1992) (quot-
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ing a comparative responsibility scheme with respect to infringement claims
involving multiple parties would require drastic change, it would solve many
of the persistent issues that joint infringement law seems incapable of
handling.
a. Potential Roadmap for Handling Infringement Claims
If Congress adopted a comparative responsibility scheme, the analysis
of infringement claims could proceed in the following manner. The first
question would be whether each and every element of the patent claim at
issue has been infringed by someone. 55 At this stage of the inquiry, it is
irrelevant whether the elements were performed by a single entity or multiple
entities; the question is simply whether each element of the patent claim was
indeed practiced. If the answer is no, the inquiry stops here because infringe-
ment liability cannot arise unless every element of the patent claim has been
performed. 156
If the answer is yes, then the court must ask whether every step of the
patent claim was performed by a single entity or its agents.157 If the answer
to this question is affirmative, then the normal infringement provisions of
§ 271 of the Patent Act should apply. The entity practicing each step of the
claim should be held liable for direct infringement, and suit against any addi-
tional third parties may potentially be brought under § 271(b) or § 271(c).
Since § 271 works well in single-infringer suits, it seems unnecessary to sub-
sume the entire infringement analysis into a comparative framework. Fur-
thermore, leaving § 271 intact in these scenarios will act as an incentive for
patentees to draft unitary claims to take advantage of the strict liability pro-
vided under § 271(a).
ing Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 935 (1981)) ("It is now widely recognized that fundamental
fairness demands a sharing of the liability."); Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation
Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 718-19 (La. 1994) (finding that the Louisiana compar-
ative fault scheme is broad enough to encompass the comparison of negligence,
strict liability torts, and intentional torts).
155. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting Roberts Dairy Co. v. U.S., 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976))
("[I]t is well established that a patent for a method or process is not infringed
unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized.").
156. Id.
157. See Lemley et al., supra note 31, at 259-60 (discussing the application of tradi-
tional § 271 principles rather than the comparative responsibility framework
and also talking about the well-established idea that a principal is not relieved
from infringement liability by virtue of his agent having performed one or more
steps of a patented claim, since a principal and agent are viewed as one legal
entity, and these cases do not address the issue of "true" joint infringement
claims).
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On the other hand, if every element of the patent claim was practiced,
but by multiple parties rather than a single entity, then a comparative respon-
sibility scheme could be used. The plaintiff could bring suit against each
party involved in the infringement, regardless of whether the party actually
performed a step in the patent claim.158 At this point, the fact-finder would
be required to account for mens rea and to apportion responsibility for the
patentee's damages between: (1) the named defendants; (2) non-parties to the
suit who bear some responsibility for the patentee's damages; and (3) the
patentee himself.
The benefits of a comparative responsibility scheme are manifold. First,
by avoiding "all-or-nothing" outcomes, a comparative-responsibility scheme
apportions liability in a manner that is more equitable for both the patentee
and the alleged infringers. Second, a comparative-responsibility scheme
eliminates a loophole in current infringement law. Third, by considering
mens rea, a comparative-responsibility scheme recognizes that joint infringe-
ment is incompatible with the strict liability offense of direct infringement.
Finally, a comparative-responsibility scheme more effectively promotes the
goals and policies of the Patent Act.
i. Flexibility and the Avoidance of an All-or-Nothing
Approach
A comparative-responsibility scheme eschews rigidity and allows for a
flexible approach that produces equitable results. A simple starting point for
courts under a comparative-responsibility scheme might be to assume that
each defendant should be liable in proportion to the number of steps he per-
formed in the patented process. From there, courts should analyze the con-
duct and mens rea of each party involved, including the patentee, and
apportion liability accordingly.
In this analysis, courts should still consider factors such as "control or
direction," but they should not be dispositive. For instance, assume that a
defendant only performed one step in a ten-step process. As a starting point,
the court might assume that this defendant should be apportioned ten percent
of the patentee's total damages. If, however, the evidence showed that this
defendant controlled and manipulated the other parties throughout the in-
fringing process, the fact-finder might find that the controlling defendant was
responsible for 90 or 100 percent of the patentee's damages.
The court should also examine the degree of care used by the patentee in
drafting his claim, but again this consideration should not be outcome-deter-
minative. For instance, assume that the patentee could have drafted a "uni-
158. Since mens rea would be considered in a comparative responsibility scheme, it
makes little sense to differentiate between "direct" and "indirect" infringers in
this context. Under a comparative responsibility scheme, a conniving defen-
dant who induces other to infringe could be principally responsible for plain-




tary" patent claim but failed to do so. His failure to properly draft his claim
makes the patentee partially responsible for his injury, and his recovery
should be reduced by that amount. The patentee is punished for not ade-
quately protecting his patent, yet is not denied recovery entirely.
In addition to protecting the patentee, a comparative-responsibility
scheme is beneficial to defendants because it eliminates the incentive for a
patentee to claim infringement against the party it believes has the "deepest
pockets." For example, assume that Microsoft performs one very minor step
in a patented process. Under current joint-infringement law, a patentee might
be motivated to argue that Microsoft "controlled" the other parties involved
and should be liable for all of the patentee's damages. Under a comparative-
responsibility scheme, however, a defendant such as Microsoft need not
worry about a patentee aggressively litigating and seeking large damages
merely because of its perceived financial resources. Instead, such a defen-
dant's liability would be based on its actual conduct and role in the infringing
process.
ii. Closes Loopholes in Infringement Liability
A comparative-responsibility scheme is also beneficial because it would
close loopholes and encourage efficient behavior. In a sense, BMC sets forth
a blueprint to avoid infringement liability. A potential infringer can avoid
liability by: (1) seeking out patent claims drafted in "distributed" rather than
"unitary" fashion; and (2) entering into an "arms-length" agreement with a
party of equal bargaining strength under which each party performs some,
but not all, of the elements of the patented claim. 159 A comparative-responsi-
bility scheme, on the other hand, eliminates the incentive to circumvent in-
fringement liability.
iii. Comparative-Responsibility Scheme Recognizes that an
Equitable Joint-Infringement Rule is Incompatible
with Strict Liability
Since it is a form of direct infringement, joint infringement is techni-
cally a strict liability offense. One gets the sense, however, that courts are
more willing to accept a joint-infringement theory when they feel that one
party was "at fault."160 For example, under the "control-or-direction" stan-
dard of BMC, the CAFC ostensibly considers joint infringement a strict lia-
bility offense. The court, however, asks whether a "mastermind" defendant
had "control or direction" over the performance of each step of the patented
process. It seems, therefore, that the CAFC uses "control or direction" as a
proxy for mens rea. This conclusion is supported by the CAFC's distinction
159. See BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
160. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F. Supp. 680,
735 (D. Del. 1995) ("[A] party cannot avoid liability for infringement by hav-
ing someone else perform one or more steps of the patented process for them").
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between "contracting out steps of a patented process" and engaging in "arms-
length agreements."161 When a party "contracts out steps" he is liable for
infringement because "[i]t would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in such
situations to escape liability."162 On the other hand, a defendant avoids in-
fringement liability when he performs part of a patented process within the
scope of an arms-length agreement. 63 "Contracting out steps" seems to con-
note bad intent, whereas an "arms-length" agreement sounds much more in-
nocent. This distinction should be irrelevant in the case of a true strict-
liability offense. The existence of this distinction supports the conclusion
that the CAFC furtively considers the defendant's mens rea through the
"control or direction" standard.
Instead of considering mens rea in this roundabout manner, a compara-
tive responsibility scheme directly addresses it. Courts could openly con-
sider whether a party was consciously trying to avoid infringement liability,
and distribute responsibility accordingly.
iv. Comparative-Responsibility Scheme Better Effects the
Goals of the Patent Act
A comparative responsibility scheme would also further the goals of the
Patent Act by protecting the intellectual property rights of patentees and en-
couraging innovation. In drafting the Patent Act, Congress sought to protect
the rights of all patent holders. The CAFC's "control or direction" standard,
however, creates several categories of second-class patentees, including: pat-
entees whose claims have been practiced by multiple parties, absent control,
rather than a single party and patentees whose claims cannot be drafted in a
"unitary" fashion. A comparative-responsibility scheme, on the other hand,
more fully protects all patentees. It neither punishes the holders of multiple-
user patent claims nor creates loopholes for arms-length contract partners to
avoid infringement.
Because a comparative-responsibility scheme would more effectively
protect the rights of patent holders, inventors would have greater incentive to
publicize valuable inventions. By increasing the incentive to patent socially
useful inventions, a comparative responsibility scheme would further the
principal goal of the Patent Act. 164
161. BMC Res., Inc., 498 F.3d at 1381.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 330-31 (1945) ("The primary purpose of our patent
system is . . . the advancement of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is
directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which will be beneficial to




Joint infringement is a troublesome area of the law. On one hand,
courts want to protect patentees and encourage innovation. After all, it mat-
ters little to the patentee whether his patent was infringed by one person or
two - he suffers the same injury either way. On the other hand, it seems
unjust to impose liability on those who innocently play a minor role in the
infringement of a patented process.
Courts have repeatedly tried, and largely failed, to strike some equitable
middle ground between these two extremes. In the CAFC's first definitive
foray into joint-infringement law, it adopted a "control-or-direction" stan-
dard. In addition to being quite unfavorable to patentees, the CAFC fails to
adequately address exactly what constitutes "control or direction." Thus,
joint infringement will likely continue to be a confused and unpredictable
area of law.
This comment suggests that either the CAFC clarify the "control-or-
direction" standard, especially with regard to the impact of contractual rela-
tions between alleged infringers, or Congress pass legislation that specifi-
cally addresses infringement by multiple parties. A comparative-
responsibility scheme is attractive because it would promote the goals of the
Patent Act, protect patentee's intellectual property rights, and more equitably
distribute infringement liability.
2009]

